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The United States Environmental Protection Agency has used environmental 
information provision as a policy tool to take advantage of consumer preferences for 
products that meet higher environmental standards. Such environmental programs include 
a variety of policies ranging from eco-labeling programs to voluntary environmental 
agreements between governments and manufacturers. This study analyzes the effects of 
two such programs - the ENERGY STAR program, an eco-labeling program, and the 
Climate Leaders program, a voluntary environmental agreement program - on consumer 
preferences for a household appliance. The study estimates consumer willingness to pay 
(WTP) for the two programs and examines factors that motivate WTP. A particular 
interest for the ENERGY STAR program is in determining how the offer of a mail-in 
rebate affects these preferences. Data used for this study was collected from an online 
survey conducted in the United States during March and April, 2009. Conditional and 
random parameter logit models, with product attributes only and with demographic and 
other individual characteristics as interaction terms, are used to analyze the data. Findings 
from this study imply that consumers are willing to pay a premium equivalent to a 
significant portion of the purchase prices for the products approved by either program. 
Also, it is found that consumers who are more concerned about environmental issues, 
such as global climate change, and who have confidence in the effects of collective 
action, are more likely to engage in the purchase of such environmentally friendly 
products. These results should help government agencies and manufacturers evaluate the 
effectiveness of environmental information provision programs.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
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In recent years, the idea of consumers being influenced by “green” (or 
environment-friendly) product attributes has generated a great deal of interest. 
Consumers with environmental concerns appear willing to pay more for products that are 
produced, distributed, and used in a way that generates less environmental damage. For 
example, previous studies have found that consumers are more prone to purchase goods 
that can help reduce global warming (Kahlor and Rosenthal, 2009), energy exploitation 
(Grover and Babiuch, 2000), water pollution (Hurley, Miller, and Kliebenstein, 2006) or 
species extinction (Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). 
Government agencies, such as the United States Environment Protection Agency 
(USEPA), have taken various actions to exploit consumers’ preferences for green goods. 
One popular action has been the introduction of eco-labeling programs. The rationale for 
these programs is that there exists a variety of goods and services which can be 
considered either green or “brown” (conventional/non-environmentally friendly) goods, 
and that information that distinguishes the two is either costly or impossible for 
consumers to acquire. Eco-labeling programs are, therefore, designed to allow consumers 
to differentiate green goods from brown goods (Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell, 1994; 
Clark, 2001). This study analyzes consumer preferences for one such program - the 
ENERGY STAR labeling program, which was established in 1992 and is awarded to 
energy-efficient home appliances (USEPA, 2007).  
The study also analyzes consumer preferences for a different type of information 
provision program. The Climate Leaders program, which was started in 2002, recognizes 
companies who commit to the use of “green” energy and the reduction of greenhouse 
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gases (GHG) (USEPA, 2009). These programs are similar in terms of promoting energy 
saving and environmental protection (USEPA, 1998); however, there are also substantial 
differences.  
By purchasing an ENERGY STAR product, consumers generate public and 
private benefits, as the appliance significantly reduces energy consumption over similar 
products that did not qualify for the ENERGY STAR (Sanchez, Brown, Webber, and 
Homan, 2008; Banerjee and Solomon, 2003). Thus, consumers can save on energy bills 
(private benefit) while reducing their impact on environmental quality through the 
reduction of GHG emissions (public benefit) (USEPA 2007a, 2007b, 2007d, 2007e). In 
addition, some home appliance retailers provide coupons, discounts or mail-in rebates for 
ENERGY STAR products1. The benefits generated from Climate Leaders products, 
however, mainly occur during the production process, and there are no private benefits to 
consumers that correspond to the cost savings enjoyed by consumers of ENERGY STAR 
products. Therefore, consumption decisions occur after the environmental benefits 
associated with the Climate Leaders program whereas they occur before any 
environmental benefits associated with the ENERGY STAR program. In addition, the 
Climate Leader Partners award is given to the company while the ENERGY STAR label 
is attached to the product. How these differences might affect consumer preferences for 
products with either the ENERGY STAR label or manufactured by a company 
participating in the Climate Leaders program is an empirical question and one of the 
questions that motivate this thesis. 
                                                 
1 Major U.S. retailers such as Best Buy, Sears and Wal-Mart have all provided some discounts or mail-in 
rebates to consumers who purchase ENERGY STAR labeled appliances. As of June 2010, such discounts 
ranged from $50 to $300 (U.S.) for refrigerators. In addition, some on-line retailers such as Bestbuy.com 
offer free delivery for ENERGY STAR labeled appliances. 
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This thesis analyzes consumer preferences for eco-labeled refrigerators, focusing 
on separate analyses and comparisons among three different scenarios: ENERGY STAR 
without rebates, ENERGY STAR with rebates, and Climate Leaders program. Data from 
a national online consumer survey is used, and a major research goal is to determine 
respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) for product attributes in each scenario. Thus, the 
two primary objectives of this thesis are to: 1) compare consumers’ WTP for ENERGY 
STAR labeled refrigerators with and without monetary rebates; and 2) estimate 
consumers’ WTP for refrigerators manufactured by companies participating in the 
Climate Leaders program.  The former is the subject of Chapter 2, while the latter is the 
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Chapter 2: Willingness to Pay for ENERGY STAR Labeled Refrigerators and 




Modern economies are characterized by industrialization and heavy use of electric 
energy. Demand for electricity has been soaring in past decades in most of the world, 
particularly in countries with large populations and economies such as Brazil (Almeida, 
Schaeffer and Rovere, 2001), China (Lu, 2006), Japan (Ueno, Sano, Saeki and Tsuji, 
2006), Mexico (Arroyo-Cabanas, Aguillon-Martinez, Ambriz-Garcia and Canizal, 2009) 
and the United States (Meyers, McMahon, McNeil and Liu, 2003).  
The rising demand for electricity generates increasing environmental and energy 
challenges. On one hand, the fact that more electricity is required to be generated is 
placing increasing pressure on upstream energy resources such as crude oil, coal and 
natural gas, the reserves of which are being depleted. And, increasing energy prices and 
unstable political situations in energy resource exporting countries have increased the 
insecurity of energy supplies. On the other hand, the generation and consumption of 
electricity emit greenhouse gases (GHG) such as carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide 
(CO) and nitrogen oxide compounds (NOx). Energy sectors are responsible for 
approximately 65% of the GHG emissions generated by human activities (IEA 2009). 
GHGs, mainly CO2, become quite stable once released into the atmosphere and keep 
absorbing thermo radiation from the earth’s surface, which accelerates global warming 
and contributes to global climate change (e.g. Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall and Tottedell, 
2000). Scientists have warned that, once a certain threshold concentration of GHGs are 
reached, severe consequences such as catastrophic climate events and interrupted thermo 
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circulation might lead to irreversibly large losses to human society and the earth’s 
ecosystem (Ansar and Sparks, 2009). 
These challenges call for policies that lead to higher energy efficiency and lower 
GHG emissions. The provision of information on the environmental effects of 
consumption is often put forward as an “appealing alternative” (Bjørner, Hansen and 
Russell, 2004) to traditional approaches to environmental regulation, as it appears to be 
less confrontational than traditional policies. The practice of attaching an “eco-label” or 
“green label” to products or services indicating that the labeled varieties are more 
environment-friendly and energy-efficient than unlabeled ones, or “eco-labeling”, has 
become a popular way to provide environmental information to consumers. Rather than 
implementing mandatory policies, eco-labeling programs such as the ENERGY STAR 
program work with the “invisible hand” of the market to transform the market for energy-
consuming products and promote increased market share for energy efficient products. 
The U.S. Environment Protection Agency (USEPA) introduced the ENERGY 
STAR labeling program in 1992. The U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) joined 
USEPA in administrating the program in 1996. ENERGY STAR is a voluntary labeling 
program in which the two government agencies establish environmental and energy 
efficiency performance criteria for a variety of products and services2 and award a “label” 
(See Figure 2-1) to products that meet these criteria. As described by USEPA in its 
promotional materials, the ENERGY STAR program is designed to achieve two main 
objectives through higher energy efficiency: reduce GHG emissions and help households 
                                                 
2 To be more precise, the ENERGY STAR program also includes other items, such as energy efficient 
homes and office buildings. Thus the terminology “product” as used here is not limited to consumer goods 
and services that are sold in stores. 
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reduce their energy costs. It is expected that consumers who are concerned about the 
environment or expect cost savings in energy consumption, or both, will switch from 
using product varieties that are less energy-efficient to the labeled varieties that meet the 
criteria set forth by the ENERGY STAR program.  
USDOE is currently promoting the ENERGY STAR program by providing 
additional incentives, in the form of monetary rebates, to consumers who purchase energy 
efficient household appliances. A nationwide program, the State Energy Efficient 
Appliance Rebate Program (SEEARP), was approved by the U.S. Congress in the 2005 
Energy Policy Act to develop rebate programs in all 56 U.S. states and territories.  
Funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and administered by the 
USDOE, SEEARP is designed to encourage consumers to purchase ENERGY STAR 
qualified household appliances and replace their outdated, inefficient appliances 
(USDOE, 2010). A total fund of $300 million is to be allocated nationally, and according 
to a USEPA market study, over 50 million Americans were eligible for rebates in 2009 
(USEPA, 2010). Through the national rebate program, the average values of rebates for 
ENERGY STAR qualified refrigerators in the U.S. range from $50 to $700 (USDOE 
2010). Compared with an estimated average price range for refrigerators between $926 
and $2,408 (Clark, Jensen, Russell, Yen and Hanemann, 2011), consumers could save 
anywhere from 6% to 30% of their purchasing costs through rebates. Through June 30, 
2010, it is reported that a total of 689,000 rebate applications were approved and paid to 
consumers (USDOE, 2010). The effects of rebates on consumer behavior are often 
discussed in marketing studies (e.g. Tat, 1994; Soman, 1998; Silk and Janiszewski, 2008); 
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however, to our knowledge, we could find no previous studies on the possible effects of 
rebates on consumer preferences for ENERGY STAR labeled refrigerators. 
Thus, this study attempts to analyze the differences between willingness to pay 
(WTP) for ENERGY STAR labeled products that are sold with a mail-in rebate and 
without such a rebate, and what factors influence those differences. The factors examined 
include environmental concern, energy cost-savings, and demographic and 
socioeconomic status. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next 
section provides a review of the relevant literature. A discussion of the methods and 
procedures employed in this study follows. The results are then presented and in the final 
section some conclusions and ideas for further research are offered.   
Literature Review 
The idea of providing environmental information to consumers is based on the 
goal of empowering consumers to act on their preferences for environment-friendly and 
energy-saving (often referred to as “eco” or “green”) products and services.  Previous 
studies have shown that consumers have exhibited interest in “green” goods of various 
categories (household products, appliances, foods, etc.) and are willing to pay more for 
these goods than for conventional alternatives with similar product attributes (e.g. 
Bjørner, Hansen and Russell, 2004; Loureiro, McCluskey and Mittelhammer, 2001; 
Cason and Gangadharan, 2002; Amacher, Koskela and Ollikainen, 2004; Banerjee and 
Solomon, 2003). The motivation that drives consumers to make such “green” purchasing 
choices could come from a variety of sources, such as the public benefits associated with 
reduced emissions and better environmental quality or the private benefits associated 
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with cost saving in energy consumption and monetary rebates. Theoretical models 
assume that people generate higher utility from such diverse sources as: better 
environmental quality (Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell, 1994), the money they can 
expect to save with the use of energy-saving products (Banerjee and Solomon, 2003), a 
better self image (Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2006), or an improved moral 
reputation achieved by conforming to social norms (Bernabou and Tirole, 2006; Brekke, 
Kipperberg and Nyborg, 2007). 
Manufacturers have attempted to capitalize on consumer interest in green goods 
by telling consumers how green their products are in advertisements (Mason, 2008). This 
type of environmental information is often referred to as “self-labeling” (Baski and Bose, 
2007) or “first party information” (OECD, 1997), as it comes directly from the 
manufacturer and directly targets potential consumers without the involvement of 
government agencies or other third parties. But many may doubt the reliability of first 
party information, as manufacturers would be motivated to exaggerate the environment-
friendly nature of their products (Harbaugh, Maxwell and Roussillon, 2006). Many 
studies (e.g. Kuhn, 1999; Mason, 2006, 2008; Amacher, Koskela and Ollikainen, 2004; 
Innes, 2006; Hamilton and Zilberman, 2006; Harbaugh, Maxwell and Roussillon, 2006; 
Baski and Bose, 2007; Ibanez and Grolleau, 2008) have noted that such risks of moral 
hazard and imperfect competition could degrade the quality of such information and 
reduce consumer interest in green products, resulting in market failures. In extreme 
situations, the presence of misleading environmental information could even force the 
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“honest” environment-friendly manufacturers out of the market, leading to adverse 
selection or the “Lemons” effect described by Akerlof (1970).  
With uncertainty and asymmetry of information between manufacturers and 
consumers in the market for green products, there is a role for government agencies in the 
provision of environmental information. For example, an “official” label, operated by a 
government agency, could help alleviate the information asymmetry and uncertainty 
associated with first party information. In fact, according to a study reported by OECD 
(1997), the so-called Type I (third party, often supported by governments3) labels are the 
most common type of eco-labels around the world, such as Der Blaue Engel (“The Blue 
Angel”) initiated in Germany (then West Germany) in 1977, Environmental Choice 
initiated in Canada in 1988, Nordic Svanen (“Nordic Swan”) initiated in Nordic countries 
in 1989, and European Flower initiated in the European Union in 1992. 
An eco-labeling program initiated in the United States is the ENERGY STAR 
program. In general, home appliances along with other energy-consuming products sold 
in the United States have to meet basic energy efficiency standards set forth by the U.S. 
federal and/or state governments. The criteria of energy efficiency for a product to be 
certificated with an ENERGY STAR label are higher than the general federal and state 
standards (USEPA, 2007).  Currently, the ENERGY STAR labels are applied to over 
fifty categories of products and over 40,000 product models (USEPA, 2011). In 2009 
alone, USEPA estimates that Americans saved enough energy to avoid GHG emissions 
equivalent to those from 30 million cars, while saving nearly $17 billion on their utility 
                                                 
3 See OECD 1997. Three types of labels were distinguished: Type I (third party certification), Type II 




bills through the use of ENERGY STAR products (USEPA, 2010). In the long term, 
USEPA estimates that by 2016 ENERGY STAR products will have reduced GHG 
emissions by nearly 500 million metric tons of carbon equivalents and saved consumers 
over $202 billion (2006) in total energy costs (USEPA 2007). 
 Environmental concern is often found to be positively related with consumer 
choice of eco-labeled products and WTP for those products. For example, in a study of 
the Nordic Svanen label, Bjørner, Hansen and Russell (2004) examined a Danish 
consumer panel with detailed information on actual purchases from the beginning of 
1997 to January 2001 and found that the label had a significant effect on consumers’ 
brand choices for toilet paper, corresponding to a marginal WTP for the label of 13–18% 
of the price of the toilet paper.  
Private benefits, on the other hand, are also factors that can motivate consumers to 
purchase green products (Kotchen, 2006, 2007). Particularly, because household 
appliances that are declared to be “cost-saving” are often purchased with higher prices 
than the prices of appliances that have lower energy efficiency (Wallander, 2008), hence 
from the perspective of consumers they often expect that the premium they paid for 
energy efficient appliances can be compensated by accumulative cost savings during the 
lifetime of the appliance (McNeil, 2010). While energy prices vary in different regions, 
there is evidence that energy efficient refrigerators can generate significant energy 
savings. For example, by replacing older model refrigerators with newer, more-efficient 
models in Mexico, a annual electricity saving of 4.7 TWh (trillion watt-hour), which 
represents one third of the domestic electricity consumption, could be achieved (Arroyo-
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Cabanas et al., 2009). Further, it is estimated that the implementation of GB12021.2, the 
mandatory national standard for refrigerator efficiency, could save at least 1,292.2 TWh 
in China from 2003 to 2023 (Lu, 2006). Studies on energy efficient refrigerators in 
Canada (Young, 2008), Japan (Shimoda et al., 2010), Malaysia (Saidur et al., 2007), 
India (McNeil, 2010) and Brazil (Vendrusculo et al., 2009) also found similar results.  
Therefore, consumers may be motivated to pay for energy efficiency to generate 
cost-savings. For example, Revelt and Train (1998) estimated consumer preference for 
energy-efficient refrigerators through data collected in southern California, and found 
that consumers were willing to pay $2.12 to $2.46 per dollar saved on energy costs. 
Similarly, Sammer and Wuestenhagen (2006) studied the effects of the European Energy 
Label, and found that European consumers were willing to pay a premium of about 30% 
of the purchase price for eco-labeled washing machines. Ward et al. (2011) focused on 
the effects of the ENERGY STAR label on consumer preferences for refrigerators, and 
found WTP for the label to be between $249.82 and $349.30, depending on the specific 
econometric models used. However, that study did not consider what effects a mail-in 
rebate might have on consumer preferences.  
 The promotional strategy of providing monetary incentives to offset purchase 
costs to consumers is observed in a variety of markets (Tat, 1994; Soman and Gourville, 
2005; Silk and Janiszewski, 2008; Aydin and Porteus, 2009). The provision of price-
related incentives is done to attract price-sensitive consumers. In providing these 
incentives, manufacturers and vendors expect to increase unit sales and discriminate 
among consumers with different price sensitivities (Silk and Janiszewski, 2008). Popular 
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incentives of this type include manufacturers’ or store coupons, instant discounts or 
rebates at point of sale, and mail-in rebates after purchase. 
 Mail-in rebates offer consumers monetary reimbursements after purchasing a 
product (Jolson,Wiener and Rosecky, 1987; Tat, Cunningham III and Babakus, 1988), 
conditional on their investment of effort (Silk and Janiszewski, 2008) in following the 
instructions and requirements imposed by manufacturers or vendors. A typical rebate 
process might last for several months, as consumers need to mail application for the 
rebate with proof of purchase and rebate forms to manufacturers or vendors, wait for the 
application to be approved, and, after approval, wait for the rebate check to arrive 
(Soman, 1998; Soman and Gourville, 2005). Manufacturers and vendors prefer rebates to 
instant discounts because rebates provide partial money reimbursements only after sales 
of products (Soman, 1998; Aydin and Porteus, 2009), and most of the efforts required to 
award the rebate are borne by consumers (Tat, 1994). However, the monetary and time 
costs make the rebate process tedious to consumers, and it is often found that the actual 
rate of consumers that apply for rebates are much lower than expected (Soman and 
Gourville, 2005; Silk and Janiszewski, 2008). Therefore, the efficiency of, and consumer 
response to, mail-in rebates are often questioned in marketing studies (Soman and 
Gourville, 2005; Silk and Janiszewski, 2008).  
Besides, the information about the product that mail-in rebate delivers to 
consumers is uncertain. For example, Revelt and Train (1998) treated rebate as a dummy 
variable in their study on refrigerators, explaining that a rebate is perceived by consumers 
in two possible ways: consumers may consider a rebate as a positive signal of cost-saving, 
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or consider a rebate as a negative signal as refrigerators with rebates are “too poor to sell 
on their own merits”. They concluded that consumers hold various views about rebates, 
with the number of consumers who held positive perceptions being about the same as 
those who held negative perceptions.  
Datta and Gulati (2010) examined the effects of rebates on the market share of 
ENERGY STAR qualified appliances, and quantified the costs and benefits of providing 
rebates to consumers. Their results indicated that an increase of one dollar of rebate 
values leads to a 0.3% increase in demand for ENERGY STAR labeled clothes washers. 
Rebates appeared to have no significant effects on dishwasher or refrigerator purchases.  
Data and Survey Methods 
 The data for conducting this study were collected through an online survey hosted 
by Knowledge Networks® (KN) during March and April of 20094. Unlike other Internet 
research that covers only individuals with Internet access, KN surveys are not limited to 
current Internet users or computer owners. KN recruits potential panelists aged eighteen 
years or older by probability-based sampling to represent the U.S. population. KN selects 
households using list-assisted random-digit dial (RDD) techniques based on a sample 
frame of the U. S. residential landline telephone universe. About 70% of the sample 
telephone numbers could be matched with a valid postal address, and such address-
matched cases were all mailed an advance letter informing them that they had been 
selected to participate in the panel. Trained interviewer/recruiters then attempt to 
                                                 
4 See Clark et al. (2011) for details of this survey, its background, purpose and design. 
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interview all sampled phone numbers known to be associated with households5 (Dennis, 
2009). Households that informed interviewers that they had a home computer and 
Internet access were asked to take their surveys using their own equipment and Internet 
connection.  If the household did not have a computer and access to the Internet, they 
were provided with a laptop computer (previously a WebTV device was provided) and 
free monthly Internet access. Incentive points redeemable for cash were provided to other 
respondents for completing surveys (Dennis, 2009).  
Panel members selected for this survey were contacted by a personalized e-mail 
invitation with an Internet link to the survey. The goal for the survey was to collect a total 
of 1,200 qualified interviews. Invitations to participate in the study were sent to a random 
sample of 2,195 panel members, and 1,395 qualified responses were collected before the 
survey was closed for further responses, providing a completion rate of 64%. After the 
study data were returned from the field, KN designed a post-stratification process to 
adjust for survey non-response and non-coverage due to possible sampling and non-
sampling errors from the sampling design and recruitment strategy. For example, KN 
excluded those banks of telephone numbers (a bank consists of 100 numbers) with less 
than 2 directory-listings. Additionally, an over-sample was conducted with high 
concentrations of minority groups (mainly African American and Hispanic households) 
based on Census data, while telephone numbers that did not match valid mailing 
addresses or households living in geographic areas which were not covered by MSN® TV 
service network were under-sampled. A panel demographic post-stratification weight was 
                                                 
5 Cases sent to recruiters were dialed for up to 90 days with at least 14 dial attempts on cases where no one 
answered the phone calls. Extensive refusal conversion was also performed. 
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designed for sample adjustments using demographic distributions retrieved from the most 
recent data from the Current Population Survey. Several benchmark distributions were 
utilized: gender (male, female), age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60 or above), race/ethnicity 
(White/Non-Hispanic, Black/Non-Hispanic, Other and two or more Races/Non-Hispanic, 
Hispanic), education (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor and 
beyond), census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West), reside in metropolitan area 
(yes, no) and Internet access (yes, no). All completed cases from the field data were used 
to calculate comparable distributions to compare with the benchmark distributions using 
an iterative proportional fitting procedure. After this final post-stratification adjustment, 
the distribution of the calculated weights were examined to identify and, if necessary, 
trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The post-
stratified and trimmed weights were then scaled to the sum of the total sample size. The 
resulting weights were applied to all the results in this study.  
The survey employed a contingent choice experiment to collect data on consumer 
preferences. The contingent choice experiment technique (sometimes also referred to as 
conjoint analysis) represents an extension of the traditional contingent valuation method 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989), and has been widely employed in psychology, marketing 
and transportation research (Louviere, 1988). The contingent choice experiment is 
designed to model respondents' choices as a function of the features of a product or 
service (Vermeulen, Goos and Vandebroek, 2008). Respondents in a contingent choice 
experiment are provided with a series of choice sets with more than two alternatives that 
have comparable but different attributes, and each respondent is asked to repeatedly 
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choose a preferred alternative out of each set of alternatives (Vermeulen, Goos and 
Vandebroek, 2008). The results of choice experiments allow the estimation of 
preferences over of a product and are consistent with random utility theory (Adamowicz, 
Boxall, Williams and Louviere, 1998).  
Among all ENERGY STAR qualified household appliances, refrigerator/freezer 
(“refrigerator”) is selected to be the object of this study. According to USDOE, 
refrigerators consume more energy than most other home appliances (see Figure 2-2). 
Also, consumers are familiar with ENERGY STAR labeled refrigerators, as 74% of 
households reported having seen the ENERGY STAR label on refrigerators (USEPA, 
2007b). In addition, the ENERGY STAR label appears to be popular in the refrigerator 
market, as labeled refrigerators had captured approximately 58% of the market, as 
reported in the 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey (Davis, 2010).  
Four different versions of the survey were fielded with the only difference 
between the four being the type of environmental label used in the choice task (and the 
wording of information screens and follow-up or debriefing questions that referenced the 
label). The first two versions used an ENERGY STAR label. The description of the 
ENERGY STAR label was the same in the two versions except that one not only 
promised energy cost savings but also a $50 mail-in rebate from the respondent’s utility 
company. The third survey version used the manufacturer’s participation in the Green 
Power Partnership (USEPA, 2011c) as the basis for a label, while the fourth used 
participation in the Climate Leaders program (USEPA, 2011b) as the basis. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of the four different versions of the survey instrument: 1) 
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ENERGY STAR with rebate (355 responses, 25.4% of the total completed and valid 
responses); 2) ENERGY STAR without rebate (349 responses, 25%); 3) Green Power 
Partners (338 responses, 24.2%) and 4) Climate Leaders (353 responses, 25.3%).  
Responses for 1) and 2) are used in the analysis described in this chapter.  
Prior to the choice experiment, respondents were asked questions about their 
home and household characteristics, usage and knowledge of refrigerators, when and how 
they acquired their refrigerators, and what their roles were in decision-making related to 
refrigerator purchase.  
These questions were followed by a series of “information screens” where the 
respondents were provided basic information about the refrigerator attributes that 
appeared in the contingent choice experiment. Each information screen was immediately 
followed by a question asking whether the respondent had enough information about this 
attribute and was ready to proceed, or would like more information. If the respondent 
indicated that they would like more information on the attribute, another screen with 
more details on the attribute was provided. Figure 2-3 shows the information screens for 
both the with and without rebate versions of the ENERGY STAR label. Both information 
screens informed respondents of how much they could expect to save in annual electricity 
costs with an ENERGY STAR labeled refrigerator as compared to a refrigerator that only 
met the basic federal standard for energy consumption. An estimated annual electricity 
cost saving of $14 was provided to respondents based on USEPA estimates of cost-
savings ranging from $12 to $15.  
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The contingent choice experiment followed the information screens. At the 
beginning of the choice experiment, respondents were asked to assume that all of the 
choices fit in the space that they had for a refrigerator, were available in the color or 
finish that they wanted, and had both automatic defrost and a built-in icemaker. The 
contingent choice experiment consisted of fourteen choice tasks, that required 
respondents to answer the following question:  
“If you needed to buy a refrigerator and these were your only options, which 
would you choose?”  
The respondents were allowed to choose from three varieties of refrigerators defined by 
different combinations of product attributes, including price ($879, $929, $979, and 
$1,029), brand (LG, GE, Whirpool, and Kenmore), configuration (side-by-side and 
French door), internal capacity (23.78, 24.52, 25.34, and 25.83 cubic feet), external 
dispenser (none, ice only, water only, or both ice and water), and ENERGY STAR label 
(yes, and no). A “None” option was also available to the respondents (Vermeulen, Goos 
and Vandebroek, 2008). Thus, a total of four choices were available to the respondents in 
each choice task. An example of one of the choice tasks is provided in Figure 2-4.   
Several sets of Likert-scale questions were presented to respondents following the 
conjoint choice experiment. These questions focused on respondent behavior and 
attitudes toward the environment and climate change. Some of the questions were based 
on the New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap, van Liere, Mertig, and Jones, 2000). Further, 





The data collected from responses to the choice tasks reflect respondents’ 
preferences for the alternatives that are described by the attributes. Such preferences 
usually vary based on the differences in attributes that define each alternative, and can be 
used to examine WTP for attribute changes (Adamowicz et al., 1998). Consumer 
preferences can be characterized using a random utility model (RUM). A RUM can be 
expressed as (McFadden, 1974): 
    	  
′	  	       1 
where  is the utility individual i receives from choosing alternative j   .  
	 is the “approximated” utility characterized by a vector of observable attributes, 
	. 
 is a vector that measures the weights that the individual places on these attributes, 
and 	 represents all other unobservable and unknown factors and is treated as random. 
Utility is assumed to be strictly monotonic, homogeneous of degree zero and quasi 
convex in all income and prices. Individual i chooses alternative j if   ,  j 
s and ,   . The outcome of the model can then be predicted through estimation of the 
probability that the alternative j is chosen, and the estimation is heavily influenced by the 
assumptions placed on the error terms. 
Conditional Logit 
If one assumes that the error terms are independent and identically distributed 
(IID) with extreme values across individuals, then the probability that the individual 
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chooses alternative j can be estimated using the conditional logit (CL) model (McFadden, 
1974): 
   exp 




*             2 
The maximum likelihood estimated parameter vector 
, is defined through maximizing 
the sample log-likelihood: 
log 0





   3 
where 1  is a dichotomous indicator such that 1  1 if alternative j is chosen and zero 
if not.  
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives  
As is commonly acknowledged, there are several limitations to the CL model. 
One such limitation is the property that the relative odds ratio of choosing one alternative 
against any other alternative is not affected by any factors other than the attributes of the 




′	 ∑ exp 
′%&'()⁄
exp 




′6     4 
This property, known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), means that the 
probability of choosing between any two alternatives is unaffected by the presence or 
absence of any other alternatives in the choice set (Train, 2003; Hensher and Greene, 
2003). In addition, the CL fails to take into consideration variation across individual 
decision-makers’ “tastes” (Train 2003) or preferences, this principle is referred to as 
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homogeneity across individuals (Train 2003; Hensher 2004). Even repeated and over 
time choices made by a single individual are considered irrelevant of each other.  
Random Parameter Logit  
The random parameter or mixed logit (RPL) model avoids IIA and the 
homogeneity of preferences limitations that characterize the CL model (McFadden and 
Train, 2000; Train, 2003; Hensher and Greene, 2003; Hensher, 2004). The RUM 
equation for the RPL model takes a similar form as in Equation (1), except that the 
weight parameter is treated as random and allowed to vary across individuals (and is thus 
marked with subscript i) in order to accommodate individual heterogeneity, or: 
  
′	  	             5 
where the vector of parameters  
 represents the weights individual i places on attributes 
	, and 	 is the random error term. Thus, the probability of individual i choosing 
alternative j is defined as: 







            6 
where <
|>? is the density of all possible values of 
 characterized by parameters > 
(Train 2003).  
Because   is now determined by an indefinite multidimensional integral that 
does not have a closed form solution (Train, 2000), outcomes are acquired through 
“simulation” which includes repeatedly drawing values of 
 from the density <
|>? 
and using the draws to evaluate the logit probability (Brownstone and Train, 1999; Train, 
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2000, 2003; Hensher and Greene, 2003). Based on the average evaluated logit 
probabilities from the repeated draws, the vector of maximum likelihood estimators >B is 
defined by maximizing the “simulated” log-likelihood: 





   7 
where  CD is the simulated value of the probability of individual i choosing alternative 
j. The vector of preferences 
 is now determined by two elements: the mean of individual 
preferences for each attribute that is “fixed” and constant across the population of all 
individuals (“homogeneous preferences”), and the individual’s particular preferences for 
a certain attribute that are stochastic deviations from the mean (“random/heterogeneous 
preferences”). Thus, in the RPL specification, the factors that affect the utility individual i 
derives from choosing alternative j can now be interpreted as: 
  
′	  	   >′	  F′	  	            8 
 where > stands for the homogeneous preferences, and Fstands for the stochastic 
deviation or the heterogeneous preferences, which is assumed IID with extreme values. 
Calculating Willingness-to-Pay 
For the CL model, WTP for the mth non-price attribute is the negative of the ratio 
of the estimated parameters of attribute m and the price attribute, or: 
HI D  JKLD KLMN*             9 
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where KLD is the estimated parameter of the mth attribute and KLMN is the estimated price 
parameter. 
For the RPL model, the means of the estimated parameters can be used to 
estimate WTP (Hensher and Greene, 2003). Thus, the WTP for the mth non-price attribute 
is: 
HI D  JP̂D KLMN*             10 
where P̂D is the maximum likelihood estimated parameter of the mth attribute and KLMN is 
the estimated price parameter. For this study, each individual’s utility is homogeneous of 
degree zero in income and prices, i.e., the parameter of price is assumed “fixed” with 
random deviation equal to zero6. 
Incorporating Demographic Characteristics 
 Differences in demographic, socioeconomic and other individual characteristics 
can also be incorporated into the analysis, by creating interaction terms of between 
product attributes and these characteristics in both the CL (Steckel and Vanhonacker, 
1988) and the RPL (Gonul and Srinivasan, 1993; Brandt, Lavin and Hanemann, 2008) 
models. With interaction terms, the RUM equation for the CL model is defined as: 
  
′	  S′T	  	      11 
                                                 
6 This assumption does not have to be made, particularly if one defines the price parameter to be distributed 
other than normally and finds evidence that there are random effects in the price parameter. See Hensher 
and Greene (2003) for details on different possible distributions. 
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where Zi is a vector of characteristics for individual i and iθ  is a vector of parameters for 
the interaction terms, ZiXij. The WTP for the m
th non-price attribute is then obtained as 
follows: 
 HI D  J K
LD  S,′TUV
KLMN
        12 
where KLD is the estimated parameter of the mth attribute, KLMN is the estimated price 
parameter, mθ̂ is the estimated vector of parameters and iZ is the sample mean of 
individual characteristics. Similarly, the RUM equation for the RPL model is: 
  >′	  F′	  S′T	  	          13 
In this case, WTP for the mth non-price attribute is obtained as follows: 
HI D  J P̂D  S
,′TUV
KLMN
        14 
Selection of the Random Terms 
When estimating an RPL model with many attributes, it is important to 
investigate the candidates for random parameters. Theoretically, this procedure is needed 
to ensure that the specification of an RPL model is appropriate. Practically, this 
procedure is necessary because of the limitations of statistical software packages. For 
example, in the STATA software package, the maximum number of random parameters 
allowed in one equation is 20. Previous studies have suggested several approaches to 
investigate this issue. Estimating a CL model would be a “good starting point”, as it 
would help to ensure that the data are clean (Hensher and Greene, 2003) and the 
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significances of parameters from a preliminary model that has less complex relationships 
among variables (Louviere, Hensher and Swait, 2000) can help establish candidate 
attributes. Once a (preliminary) set of candidates are obtained, they can be further tested 
for the significances of the random effects.  
One option is the Lagrange Multiplier test proposed in McFadden and Train 
(1998) for the significance of random error components. The test procedure was 
succinctly summarized by Brownstone (2001) and works by constructing artificial 
variables: 
H  W J WXV Y, with WXV  $ W         15 
where Pij is the CL choice probability. The CL model is then re-estimated including these 
artificial variables. The null hypothesis of no random effects in attributes W is then 
rejected if the coefficients of the artificial variables H are significantly different from 
zero. A Wald or likelihood ratio test statistic can also be used to carry out the actual test 
for the joint significance of the artificial variables. These tests can be carried out with 
most software packages that estimate the CL models. However, because these tests are 
only for the joint significances of variables, they are not as useful for identifying which 
parameters to randomize in an RPL model specification (Hensher and Greene, 2003). 
 Another test is to run the RPL model assuming all parameters are random, and 
then examine the significances of the estimated standard deviations using a zero-based t-
test for individual parameters and a likelihood-ratio (LR) test for the overall contribution 
of the additional information (Hensher and Greene, 2003). However, when a large 
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number of explanatory variables are included, it can be problematic to run the model with 
a full set of random parameters. 
 In this study, we use the LR test suggested in Hensher and Green (2003) to test 
the significance of our choice of random parameters. Since we have more than 30 
variables in the model, which exceeds the limit of variables allowed to be randomized in 
STATA, we were not able to test neither the overall nor the individual significance of the 
random effects for all of the variables. Still, we managed to put those fixed parameters 
into several groups and do the LR test one at a time for each group, and it appears from 
the results presented in Table 2-12 that our established form of random parameters is 
acceptable7. 
Simulation with Halton Random Draws 
 The estimation process for the RPL models involves random draws of possible 
parameter values, which rely on Halton sequences (Halton, 1960). The methodology of 
Halton draws used for RPL estimation is defined as follows (Train, 2000): 1) generate a 
Halton sequence for each dimension of the mixing distribution <
|>? using prime 
numbers; and 2) calculate for each element of each sequence the inverse of the 
cumulative mixing distribution that is appropriate for that dimension. For example, 
calculate the inverse cumulative normal distribution of each element of each sequence if 
<
|>?  is normally distributed. The results are the Halton draws from the mixing 
distribution. The length of each sequence is determined by the number of observations 
(N) and the number of draws performed (R), and ^ _ `  10 elements are generated. 
                                                 
7 The groups of explanatory variables with “fixed” parameters, except the price variable, are: age and 
gender, income, education, race”, location, household characteristics, and attitudes.  
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Theory suggests dropping the first ten elements of each sequence because they tend to be 
highly correlated; after dropping those elements, each of the next R elements are used for 
each observation (Train, 2000). 
In applications, the simulation process usually requires a large number of Halton 
draws to assure low simulation errors (Train, 2000), which translates into extended 
processing time (Train, 2000; Bhat, 2001; Hensher and Greene, 2003; Chang and Lusk, 
2011). There is no generally agreed standard on how large the number of draws needs to 
be, but a generally agreed idea is that the draws are sufficient when the random 
parameters are confirmed “stable” (Hensher and Greene 2003). So how many draws are 
sufficient? With an example model of three alternatives and two random parameters, 
Hensher and Greene (2003) stated that as low as 25 “intelligent” draws are “sufficient to 
produce stability … although 100 appear to be a ‘good’ number”. Similarly, Bhat (2001) 
and Train (2003) suggested that, in a model with a relatively small number of alternatives 
and observations, simulation variance in the estimated parameters was lower using 100 
than 1,000 Halton draws. However, more complex models with more random parameters 
and larger sample sizes require more draws (Hensher and Greene, 2003), and for this 
analysis, 1,000 Halton random draws were used to estimate the RPL models.  
To analyze WTP for ENERGY STAR labels, and compare the potential 
differences between WTP for the label with and without rebates, we employ both the CL 
and the RPL models. For each version of survey data, a CL and an RPL model, consisting 
of only the product attributes, and a CL and an RPL model, consisting of both the 
attribute variables and interaction terms between the ENERGY STAR label and all 
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demographic, attitudinal and other factors were estimated. Model estimation was 
conducted with the STATA software package and for the RPL models, the mixlogit 
module (Hole, 2007).  
Variables and Model Specification 
Variable names, definitions and descriptions, along with sample statistics, are 
presented in Table 2-1. The product attribute variables included in this study are price 
(Price), capacity (Capacity), three binary variables for brands (LG, GE, and Kenmore, 
where Whirlpool is the base case), one binary variable for configuration (Frenchdoor, 
where the Side-by-Side is the base case), three binary variables for the design of external 
dispensers (Ice for ice-only dispensers, Water for water-only, and IandW for both ice and 
water, where no external dispenser is the base case), and the variable for the ENERGY 
STAR certification (Label). All product attributes but price were randomized in the RPL 
models. Assuming the price parameter to be “fixed” allows us to obtain normally 
distributed estimates of WTP for the non-price attributes (Train, 2000). In addition to the 
product attribute variables, an alternative specific constant (ASC) was created to indicate 
the “None” option, where ASC = 1 for the none option.  
Age, gender, race, household income, education, number of household members, 
ownership status of living quarters, and residential location enter the models by 
interacting with the Label variable. Including socioeconomic characteristics allows us to 
account for heterogeneous preferences among different individuals. Previous studies have 
suggested possible effects of these characteristics: 
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• Age was found to be positively related to participation in green electricity 
programs (Clark, Kotchen, and Moore, 2003), but negatively related to WTP of 
metropolitan residents in East Berlin for foods that are produced with techniques 
consistent with environmental stewardship (Moon, Florkowski, Bruckner and 
Schonhof, 2002). We expect age to be negatively related to WTP for Label, as 
younger people might be more amenable to purchase of eco-labeling products. 
• Education was found to have a positive impact on consumer demand for 
eco-labeled apples (Blend and van Ravenswaay, 1999), but a negative impact on 
consumer demand for eco-labeled seafoods (Johnson, Wessells, Donath and 
Asche, 2001). In this study, we assume that more education leads to better 
understanding of the labeling program and the attributes and functions of a 
labeled refrigerator, and thus education should have positive effects on WTP for 
the label. 
• Females have been found to have stronger environmental attitudes and 
behaviors than males (Zelezny, Chua and Aldrich, 2000). Specifically, females 
with presence of children and a large household size are found with higher 
concerns of environmental quality and thus have higher WTP for eco-labeled food 
(Loureiro, McCluskey and Mittelhammer, 2002). Thus, we hypothesize that 
female respondents will have higher WTP for the label than the male respondents, 
and a larger household size will have a positive impact on the WTP for the label. 
• The status of living quarters has been found to be highly correlated with 
the households’ attitudes towards energy efficient appliances. Davis (2010) 
compared the appliance ownership patterns between homeowners and renters and 
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suggested that renters are significantly less likely to have energy efficient 
refrigerators and other appliances. Thus, we expect to find that renters have a 
lower WTP for the ENERGY STAR label than homeowners. 
• To capture the possible impacts of regional differences in energy costs on 
consumer preferences, we include a variable that defines the average electricity 
rate per kilowatt-hour (Kwh) by county. Ward et al. (2011) found electricity rate 
to be significantly and positively related with consumer preferences for ENERGY 
STAR labeled refrigerators. We expect to find similar results. 
 We used factor analysis (FA) to retrieve the latent “factors” from responses to the 
Likert-scale questions asking respondents about their environmental attitudes and 
awareness. FA assumes that observed variables are linear combinations of underlying 
unobserved variables, a.k.a. “factors” and error terms; some of the factors are considered 
“unique” to two or more variables and will not contribute to covariation, while the 
“common” factors will. Therefore through estimating interdependencies among those 
variables, common factors can be determined and scales or factor scores can be 
constructed (Kim and Mueller, 1978). Using the factor command in STATA, a 
preliminary factor analysis was applied on the responses to the opinion questions, and the 
VARIMAX method was applied to the results (Johnston, Wessells, Donath and Asche, 
2001). The initial analysis gave a set of five estimated factors, and only the first two 
factors were kept as they were the only two factors with eigenvalues that exceeded the 
threshold eigenvalue of one (Variyam, Jordan and Epperson, 1990). The STATA predict 
command generated scores for these two factors. These factors can be characterized 
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based on the questions included in each as: 1) the perception of consumer effectiveness in 
the effects of their behaviors on the environmental quality and the manufacturers (PCE);  
and 2) attitudes towards and awareness of global climate change (GCC). Chronbach’s 
alpha (Chronbach, 1970) was used to test the reliability of the resulting factor scores, and 
both appeared to be reliable. The factor weights and scores can be found in Table 2-3.  
Results 
 The total possible records for the choice experiment is 14*4*N (N = number of 
respondents), where N = 355 for the without rebate version of the survey (19,880 possible 
records), and N = 349 for the with rebate version (19,544 possible records). Taking out 
missing values, the actual number of records obtained and relevant to this study was 
19,132 for the without rebate version, and 18,276 for the with rebate version.  
The estimation results for the CL and RPL models are presented in Table 2-4 
through 2-7. The fact that all or most of the random deviations of the RPL estimate 
results are significant at a 1% level or higher indicates that the application of RPL models 
to these data sets is warranted. Further, the log-likelihood values are significantly greater 
for the RPL models than the CL models for both regressions with only explanatory 
variables for product attributes and with all factors, and for both refrigerators with rebate 
and without rebate. A simple likelihood-ratio test also showed that the RPL models are 
preferred to the CL models (degrees of freedom = 10, and all tests have significantly 
large test statistics; see Tables 2-4 through 2-7). Furthermore, similar likelihood-ratio 
tests also suggested that the inclusion of factors representing respondents’ demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics is justified and preferred to the attribute only models. 
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As expected, the estimated parameters for the price variables are significant and 
negative for all models, implying that refrigerators are normal goods and that respondents 
are price-sensitive.  
The ENERGY STAR variable parameters are positive and significant (1% or 
higher level of significance) in six of the eight models. The lone exceptions are the CL 
and RPL models with all factors for the ENERGY STAR without rebate. Generally, the 
variables for refrigerator brands have negative parameters and are not significant, except 
that the variable for the brand of LG is negative and significant in all model 
specifications while Kenmore and GE are negative and significant in some models. These 
results suggest that Whirlpool, the base case, is clearly preferred to LG and somewhat 
preferred to Kenmore and GE. The parameter estimates for refrigerator capacity are 
significant and positive in all models. Similarly, the parameter estimates for external 
dispensers of water, ice or both water and ice (Water, Ice and IandW) are generally 
positive and significant. Refrigerator configuration, i.e. French door or Side by side 
(Frenchdoor), is not significant in any of the models. 
The estimated parameters for the interaction terms between demographic, 
socioeconomic and attitudinal variables and the label variable have various outcomes. 
The variable for age (Age × Label) has negative and significant parameters in the with 
rebate CL model but positive and significant parameters in without rebate CL model. The 




Male is negative and significant in both of the with rebate models but 
insignificant in both of the without rebate models. When significant, the race variables 
(White × Label, Black × Label, and Hispanic × Label) are negative.  
The education variables (College × Label and Bachelor × Label) are generally 
positive and significant in the with rebate models, but are not significant in either of the 
two without rebate models.  
Of the variables representing income (Inc1 × Label, or income between $30,000 
to $60,000; Inc2 × Label, or $60,000 to $85,000; and Inc3 × Label, or income more than 
$85,000 per year), only the highest category was positive and significant in both CL 
models while the second highest was negative and significant in the with rebate RPL 
model. The fact that respondents of the lowest range of income level showed higher 
interests in labeled refrigerators, supports our hypothesis that the private benefits from 
energy cost-saving can attract consumers to purchase energy efficient refrigerators. 
Meanwhile, we might also infer from the fact that respondents of the highest range of 
income level showed even higher interests to support our hypothesis that WTP is 
positively correlated with income. 
The parameter estimate for household size (HHSize × Label) was negative and 
significant for the with rebate CL model but positive and insignificant otherwise. Larger 
families imply more frequent refrigerator use (more things to be refrigerated and more 
often the refrigerator doors are opened and closed) and, thus, higher energy consumptions. 
Therefore energy efficient refrigerators may appear as better choices. The parameter 
estimate for home ownership (Ownership × Label) was positive and significant in the 
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with rebate RPL model but insignificant otherwise. This result indicates that if 
respondents live in rented places, they are likely to have limited choices of refrigerators 
because they may not be able to bring or purchase their own refrigerators with them, or 
that they have limited income and cannot afford purchasing houses or appliances.  
Residential location does not have a constant effect in all models. Compared to 
the base case of respondents living in western U.S., the parameter estimate for living in 
the South (South × Label) was negative and significant for the without rebate RPL model 
and positive and significant for the with rebate CL model, but insignificant otherwise. On 
the other hand, compared with rural residents, the estimate parameter for urban residents 
(Metro × Label) was positive and significant for the without rebate CL model, but 
negative and significant for the with rebate CL and RPL models. 
The estimated parameter for attitudinal variable reflecting respondents’ perceived 
consumer effectiveness (PCE × Label) was positive and significant in with rebate RPL 
model, and the estimated parameters for environmental concerns towards global climate 
change (GCC × Label) were positive and significant in all models, which meet our 
hypothesis that consumers who believe their collective actions can have significant 
effects and who have higher environmental concerns are more likely to engage in 
environmentally oriented actions, such as purchasing eco-labeled refrigerators. The lone 
unexpected results were that the estimated parameters for PCE were not significant in 
without rebate CL and RPL models, and that the estimated parameter for PCE was 
negative and significant in the with rebate CL model.  
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Further, it is shown that respondents who live in regions with higher electricity 
prices (Kwh × Label) are more willing to buy ENERGY STAR refrigerators regardless of 
whether these refrigerators are with or without rebates. 
Estimated Willingness-to-Pay 
 Estimates of WTP for all of the refrigerator attributes are presented in Tables 2-8 
through 2-10. Estimates of WTP for the ENERGY STAR label are positive and 
significant for all models. The WTP estimates using the RPL model results are, on 
average, larger than the WTP estimates using the CL model results. Similarly, the models 
including attributes and interactions generate higher WTP estimates than the models 
using product attributes only in all cases except the without rebate CL model. 
Furthermore, for the attribute only models, WTP for the ENERGY STAR label 
with rebate are, on average, lower than WTP for the label without rebate. However, when 
all interactions are included, WTP estimated from the with rebate models are higher than 
WTP estimated from the without rebate models. Overall, the highest WTP estimate is 
associated with the with rebate RPL model that includes both attributes and interactions 
($394.28). 
Conclusions and Implications 
In this study, we used data collected from contingent choice experiments for 
consumer preferences for refrigerators and the USEPA ENERGY STAR eco-labeling 
program. In general, the findings from this study provide evidence that refrigerator 
consumers are willing to pay significantly more for refrigerators that have been awarded 
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the USEPA ENERGY STAR label. Depending on the econometric models used, the 
WTP estimates for the ENERGY STAR label range from $81.68 to $394.28.  
We also examined the effect of offering a $50 mail-in rebate for ENERGY STAR 
qualified refrigerators. The results of our study suggest that WTP differed but not 
necessarily in the way one might expect. Normally, we found that, when including 
interactions between individual characteristics and the label attribute, consumers have 
higher WTP for refrigerators that are sold with a rebate. Overall, this result may inform 
government agencies and other regulators that the practice of applying eco-labels to 
energy-consuming appliances such as refrigerators can influence consumer behavior and 
provide incentives for manufacturers to produce more energy efficient appliances. 
We have also investigated the motivations for consumers to purchase eco-labeled 
refrigerators. Similar to findings of previous studies, we found that age, education level, 
gender, and income all have significant effects, while factors such as numbers of family 
members, living quarter ownership status, locations of residency and whether living in 
rural or urban areas also play important roles. 
Not surprisingly, we also found that environmentally concerned consumers and 
those who believed that their consumption decisions would have an positive impact are 
more willing to purchase environment-friendly products such as eco-labeled refrigerators. 
On the other hand, consumers who care about private benefits such as energy cost 
savings are also more willing to purchase eco-labeled refrigerators. Taken together, these 
results suggest that government sponsored eco-labeling programs can help reduce market 
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Figure 2-2. Energy Consumption of Various Home Appliances 
 



















Table 2-1. Variable Names, Definitions and Sample Statistics 
 
 
Variable Definition and Description Sample Means 
  No Rebate Rebate 
Dependent Variable N = 19132 N=18276 
Chosen 1 if the alternative is chosen, 0 otherwise 0.25 0.25 
Explanatory Variable    
Price $879, $929, $979, or $1,029  715.854 715.947 
Label 1 if Energy Star qualified, 0 if not 0.385 0.383 
Capacity 23.78, 24.52, 25.34, 25.83 cubic feet 18.631 18.633 
Frenchdoor 1 if French door style, 0 if side-by-side 0.385 0.383 
Refrigerator Brands (with "Whirlpool" as base case) 
LG 1 if LG brand, 0 otherwise 0.199 0.200 
GE 1 if GE brand, 0 otherwise 0.185 0.183 
Kenmore 1 if Kenmore brand, 0 otherwise 0.183 0.183 
External Dispenser Type (with "No Ice or Water" as base case) 
Ice 1 if equipped with external dispenser of ice only, 0 
otherwise  
0.201 0.201 
Water 1 if equipped with external dispenser of water only, 0 
otherwise  
0.184 0.182 
IandW 1 if equipped with external dispenser of both ice & water, 
0 otherwise  
0.180 0.183 
ASC 1 if “None” option, 0 otherwise 0.25 0.25 
Age Age of respondent in years divided by 10 1.780 1.772 
Age2 Age*Age 0.927 0.928 
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.188 0.178 
Race (with "Non-White, Black nor Hispanic" as base case) 
White 1 if White 0.267 0.263 
Black 1 if African-American 0.044 0.046 
Hispanic 1 if Hispanic 0.047 0.053 
Education (with "Less than college level education" as base case) 
College 1 if have some college level education 0.111 0.110 
Bachelor 1 if hold bachelor's or higher degree 0.101 0.101 
Household Income (with "Less than $30,000" as base case) 
Inc1 1 if $30,000 to $60,000 0.134 0.121 
Inc2 1 if $60,000 to $85,000 0.062 0.076 
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(Continued from Table 2-1) 
Variable Definition and Description Sample Means 
  No Rebate Rebate 
Inc3 1 if $85,000 or higher 0.081 0.083 
HHSize Head count of household members, 1-10 1.003 1.013 
Ownership 1 if Own the current living quarters, 0 if rent or others 0.270 0.276 
Residential location (with "West" as base case) 
NE 1 if reside in Northeast 0.075 0.071 
MW 1 if reside in Midwest 0.087 0.086 
South 1 if reside in South 0.136 0.140 
Metro 1 if reside in metropolitan areas 0.323 0.325 
PCE Factor analysis index score for perceived consumer 
effectiveness  
-0.006 -0.009 
GCC Factor analysis index score for attitude towards global 
climate change 
0.010 0.033 








Table 2-2. Attitudinal Questions Included in the Study* 
  
1. When I buy products, I consider how my use of them will affect the environment. 
2. By choosing environmentally friendly products, I signal to manufacturers the types 
of products they should be producing. 
3. Global climate change will have a noticeably negative impact on the environment in 
which my family and I live. 
4. There is no urgent need to take measures to prevent global climate change today. 
5. The production of electricity from renewable sources such as solar, wind and 
biomass is an effective way to combat global climate change. 
6. The most effective way to combat global climate change is to reduce energy 
consumption. 
7. We need more government regulations to force people to protect the environment. 
* Likert-scale answer choices: 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 


























Table 2-3. Factor Analysis Index for Attitudinal Questions 
 Chronbach’s alpha Factor 
Weight 
1. Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) 0.7937  
1-1. When I buy products, I consider how my use of them will affect the 
environment. 
0.6517 
1-2. By choosing environmentally friendly products, I signal to manufacturers the 
types of products they should be producing. 
0.6408 
2. Attitudes towards Global Climate Change (GCC) 0.7903  
2-1. Global climate change will have a noticeably negative impact on the 
environment in which my family and I live. 
0.6450 
2-2. There is no urgent need to take measures to prevent global climate change 
today. 
-0.5585 
2-3. The production of electricity from renewable sources such as solar, wind and 
biomass is an effective way to combat global climate change. 
0.6456 
2-4. The most effective way to combat global climate change is to reduce energy 
consumption. 
0.6983 







Table 2-4. Conditional and Random Parameter Logit Results for without Rebate 
Attribute Only Models 
    Conditional Logit     Random Parameter Logit 
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
Price -0.004*** 0.000 0.000 -0.008*** 0.001 0.000 
Label 1.021*** 0.053 0.000 2.214*** 0.214 0.000 
Capacity 0.096*** 0.032 0.003 0.164*** 0.060 0.007 
Frenchdoor -0.064 0.050 0.194 -0.142 0.329 0.666 
LG -0.250*** 0.072 0.000 -0.509*** 0.122 0.000 
GE -0.100 0.070 0.154 -0.196* 0.108 0.070 
Kenmore -0.149** 0.071 0.035 -0.244* 0.130 0.061 
Ice 0.297*** 0.074 0.000 0.375* 0.219 0.086 
Water 0.242*** 0.076 0.002 0.282* 0.156 0.069 
IandW 1.004*** 0.071 0.000 1.685*** 0.352 0.000 
ASC -0.313 0.898 0.727 -1.910 1.738 0.272 
Random Deviation 
Label 2.088*** 0.250 0.000 
Capacity 0.098** 0.049 0.047 
Frenchdoor 2.769*** 0.316 0.000 
LG -0.594*** 0.217 0.006 
GE 0.442 0.716 0.537 
Kenmore 0.842*** 0.174 0.000 
Ice 1.048*** 0.207 0.000 
Water 0.889*** 0.357 0.013 
IandW 2.107*** 0.455 0.000 
ASC -3.779*** 0.389 0.000 
Log-likelihood -6158.371     -4179.520     
Log-likelihood ratio (LR) Test: LR Statistic = 3957.702, degrees of freedom (df) = 10 
 




Table 2-5. Conditional and Random Parameter Logit Results for without Rebate All 
Factors Models 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
Price -0.004*** 0.000 0.000 -0.008*** 0.001 0.000 
Label -0.112 0.432 0.796 2.662 2.210 0.228 
Capacity 0.108*** 0.033 0.001 0.092* 0.055 0.093 
Frenchdoor -0.002 0.051 0.964 -0.149 0.313 0.634 
LG -0.247*** 0.073 0.001 -0.405*** 0.111 0.000 
GE -0.112 0.072 0.118 -0.193* 0.117 0.100 
Kenmore -0.182*** 0.072 0.011 -0.149 0.129 0.246 
Ice 0.265*** 0.075 0.000 0.353** 0.162 0.029 
Water 0.205*** 0.079 0.010 0.191 0.145 0.188 
IandW 0.952*** 0.073 0.000 1.502*** 0.249 0.000 
ASC 0.061 0.911 0.946 -3.215* 1.789 0.072 
Age × Label 0.325** 0.140 0.020 -0.407 0.481 0.398 
Age2 × Label -0.436*** 0.144 0.002 0.267 0.486 0.583 
Male × Label -0.063 0.076 0.411 0.511 0.343 0.136 
White × Label -0.492*** 0.172 0.004 -0.186 1.025 0.856 
Black × Label 0.007 0.213 0.975 -0.127 0.765 0.868 
Hispanic × Label -0.008 0.194 0.968 0.462 0.850 0.587 
College × Label -0.128 0.091 0.162 -0.006 0.395 0.988 
Bachelor × Label 0.112 0.102 0.270 0.072 0.573 0.900 
Inc1 × Label -0.028 0.104 0.788 0.212 0.550 0.700 
Inc2 × Label -0.007 0.120 0.954 -0.628 0.482 0.192 
Inc3 × Label 0.313*** 0.127 0.014 0.937 0.770 0.224 
HHSize × Label 0.016 0.029 0.593 0.103 0.104 0.321 
Ownership×Label 0.365*** 0.101 0.000 -0.189 0.599 0.752 
NE × Label 0.156 0.135 0.249 -0.010 0.870 0.991 
MW × Label 0.007 0.118 0.950 -0.851 0.656 0.195 
South × Label -0.118 0.108 0.276 -0.791* 0.470 0.092 
Metro × Label 0.409*** 0.101 0.000 0.502 0.519 0.333 
PCE × Label 0.035 0.051 0.483 0.324 0.266 0.223 
GCC × Label 0.241*** 0.050 0.000 0.770** 0.365 0.035 





(Continued from Table 2-5) 
Random Deviation 
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
Label 1.740*** 0.201 0.000 
Capacity 0.179*** 0.015 0.000 
Frenchdoor 2.715*** 0.505 0.000 
LG 0.551*** 0.186 0.003 
GE 0.384 0.244 0.115 
Kenmore 0.681** 0.306 0.026 
Ice 1.162*** 0.185 0.000 
Water 0.832*** 0.200 0.000 
IandW 2.216*** 0.219 0.000 
ASC 2.048*** 0.529 0.000 
Log-likelihood -5725.423     -3927.899     
LR Test: LR Statistic = 3595.048, df = 10 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2-6. Conditional and Random Parameter Logit Results for with Rebate 
Attribute Only Models 
    Conditional Logit     Random Parameter Logit   
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
Price -0.006*** 0.000 0.000 -0.011*** 0.001 0.000 
Label 1.041*** 0.054 0.000 2.302*** 0.217 0.000 
Capacity 0.079** 0.033 0.017 0.133** 0.054 0.015 
Frenchdoor -0.028 0.052 0.595 0.139 0.204 0.495 
LG -0.244*** 0.075 0.001 -0.323*** 0.121 0.008 
GE -0.003 0.071 0.964 -0.048 0.143 0.737 
Kenmore -0.078 0.076 0.300 -0.086 0.125 0.490 
Ice 0.378*** 0.078 0.000 0.501** 0.200 0.012 
Water 0.348*** 0.079 0.000 0.450** 0.186 0.016 
IandW 1.140*** 0.075 0.000 2.103*** 0.281 0.000 
ASC -2.434*** 0.926 0.009 -6.177*** 1.781 0.001 
Random Deviation 
Label 2.135*** 0.163 0.000 
Capacity 0.154*** 0.012 0.000 
Frenchdoor 2.750*** 0.230 0.000 
LG -0.509*** 0.174 0.003 
GE -0.852*** 0.170 0.000 
Kenmore 0.573*** 0.201 0.004 
Ice 1.496*** 0.191 0.000 
Water 0.995*** 0.227 0.000 
IandW 2.112*** 0.256 0.000 
ASC -1.452*** 0.213 0.000 
Log-likelihood -5973.480     -4107.376     
LR Test: LR Statistic = 3732.208, df = 10 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2-7. Conditional and Random Parameter Logit Results for with Rebate All Factors 
Models 
    Conditional Logit     Random Parameter Logit   
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
Price -0.006*** 0.000 0.000 -0.011*** 0.001 0.000 
Label 2.601*** 0.440 0.000 5.572*** 1.414 0.000 
Capacity 0.076*** 0.035 0.028 0.130** 0.061 0.034 
Frenchdoor -0.058 0.055 0.284 -0.156 0.240 0.516 
LG -0.236*** 0.079 0.003 -0.351** 0.147 0.017 
GE 0.015 0.075 0.839 0.010 0.155 0.947 
Kenmore -0.076 0.079 0.332 -0.118 0.135 0.379 
Ice 0.359*** 0.081 0.000 0.495** 0.209 0.018 
Water 0.321*** 0.082 0.000 0.433** 0.207 0.036 
IandW 1.143*** 0.078 0.000 2.055*** 0.297 0.000 
ASC -2.617*** 0.959 0.006 -6.424*** 1.860 0.001 
Age × Label -0.378*** 0.129 0.003 -0.831 0.526 0.114 
Age2 × Label 0.313*** 0.125 0.012 0.816 0.540 0.131 
Male × Label -0.252*** 0.084 0.003 -0.670** 0.306 0.028 
White × Label -0.753*** 0.211 0.000 -2.119** 0.895 0.018 
Black × Label -0.994*** 0.243 0.000 -3.158*** 0.961 0.001 
Hispanic × Label -0.360 0.236 0.126 -1.551* 0.893 0.082 
College × Label 0.204** 0.099 0.039 0.743** 0.369 0.044 
Bachelor × Label 0.218** 0.109 0.047 0.299 0.326 0.358 
Inc1 × Label -0.093 0.111 0.401 -0.200 0.416 0.631 
Inc2 × Label -0.091 0.129 0.480 -1.751*** 0.405 0.000 
Inc3 × Label 0.323** 0.139 0.020 -0.580 0.427 0.174 
HHSize × Label -0.061* 0.033 0.066 0.052 0.083 0.533 
Ownership×Label 0.033 0.112 0.770 2.088*** 0.396 0.000 
NE × Label 0.069 0.139 0.621 -0.578 0.502 0.250 
MW × Label -0.053 0.136 0.698 -0.336 0.412 0.414 
South × Label 0.203* 0.114 0.075 -0.040 0.370 0.913 
Metro × Label -0.326*** 0.118 0.006 -1.192*** 0.367 0.001 
PCE × Label -0.121** 0.054 0.026 0.522* 0.290 0.072 
GCC × Label 0.148*** 0.055 0.007 0.739*** 0.201 0.000 





(Continued from previous page) 
Random Deviation 
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
Label 2.336*** 0.196 0.000 
Capacity 0.162*** 0.013 0.000 
Frenchdoor 3.015*** 0.229 0.000 
LG 0.710*** 0.129 0.000 
GE 0.970*** 0.181 0.000 
Kenmore 0.642*** 0.190 0.001 
Ice 1.447*** 0.287 0.000 
Water 1.173*** 0.231 0.000 
IandW 2.309*** 0.220 0.000 
ASC 0.656*** 0.163 0.000 
Log-likelihood -5469.061     -3822.744     
LR Test: LR Statistic = 3292.634, df = 10 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2-8. Estimated WTP for Refrigerator Attributes for without Rebate Survey 
 
Attributes only 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Attribute Mean Estimate Std. Error. Mean Estimate Std. Error. 
Label 244.064*** 28.4255 285.002*** 53.644 
Capacity 23.077*** 8.1214 21.098*** 8.253 
Frenchdoor -15.398* 12.2805 -17.965 42.961 
LG -59.539*** 18.011 -65.539*** 19.311 
GE -23.569* 16.8525 -24.489* 13.484 
Kenmore -35.546** 17.7903 -31.545** 18.289 
Ice 70.985*** 18.7729 47.429* 28.256 
Water 57.928*** 19.2333 36.289** 20.924 
IandW 239.959*** 31.0522 216.020*** 53.673 
    All Factors 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Attribute Mean Estimate Std. Error. Mean Estimate Std. Error. 
Label 81.683* 65.734 325.654* 189.030 
Capacity 26.180*** 8.480 12.287** 7.727 
Frenchdoor -0.671 12.465 -18.492 41.985 
LG -59.633*** 18.459 -53.791*** 18.230 
GE -27.055** 17.805 -24.994* 15.261 
Kenmore -44.127*** 18.490 -20.153* 18.285 
Ice 63.939*** 18.851 47.026** 24.107 
Water 49.570*** 19.948 25.242* 19.869 
IandW 230.360*** 31.260 198.602*** 44.758 
 




Table 2-9. Estimated WTP for Refrigerator Attributes for with Rebate Survey 
 
Attributes only 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Attribute Mean Estimate Std. Error. Mean Estimate Std. Error. 
Label 172.945*** 15.513 207.831*** 27.124 
Capacity 13.179** 5.633 12.067** 5.156 
Frenchdoor -4.667 8.818 12.346 18.242 
LG -40.405** 12.673 -29.043** 11.255 
GE -0.401 11.937 -4.463 13.135 
Kenmore -12.935 12.720 -7.679 11.463 
Ice 62.777** 13.233 44.822* 17.999 
Water 57.800*** 13.457 40.129* 16.214 
IandW 189.415*** 18.186 189.823*** 30.507 
All Factors 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Attribute Mean Estimate Std. Error. Mean Estimate Std. Error. 
Label 329.791*** 51.189 394.276*** 92.462 
Capacity 12.352** 5.742 11.465** 5.584 
Frenchdoor -9.516 9.044 -13.523 21.617 
LG -38.469** 13.173 -31.104** 13.200 
GE 2.546 12.279 0.708 13.945 
Kenmore -12.437 12.869 -10.485 12.074 
Ice 58.410*** 13.345 43.554** 18.032 
Water 52.299** 13.687 38.376* 18.191 
IandW 186.096*** 18.059 181.968*** 30.545 
  
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2-10. Comparison of WTP for Energy Star Labels with and without Rebates 
 
Attributes only 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Model Version Mean Estimate Std. Error. Mean Estimate Std. Error. 
Energy Star without Rebate 244.064*** 28.426 285.002*** 53.644 
Energy Star with Rebate 172.945*** 15.513 207.831*** 27.124 
All Factors 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Model Version Mean Estimate 
Std. 
Error. Mean Estimate Std. Error. 
Energy Star without Rebate 81.683* 65.734 325.654* 189.030 
Energy Star with Rebate 329.791*** 51.189 394.276*** 92.462 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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The refrigerators offered were too expensive 42 44 
The refrigerators offered did not have the features you wanted 116 106 
The refrigerators offered were not better than your current 
refrigerator 36 44 
Other (Specified separately). 27 31 
Total 221 225 





Table 2-12 Log-likelihood Ratio Tests for Determining Random Terms 
RPL Models for Without Rebate (Log-likelihood value = -3927.899) 
 








-5675.709 -5669.696 -5668.019 -5645.383 -5675.948 -5690.981 -5664.487 
df 2 3 3 3 4 2 3 
LR 
Statistics 
3495.620*** 3483.594*** 3480.240*** 3434.968*** 3496.098*** 3526.164*** 3473.175*** 
RPL Models for With Rebate (Log-likelihood value = -3822.744) 
 










-5416.696 -5442.415 -5438.009 -5415.227 -5425.461 -5433.067 -5434.686 
df 2 3 3 3 4 2 3 
LR 
Statistics 
3187.904*** 3239.342*** 3230.530*** 3184.966*** 3205.434*** 3220.646*** 3223.884*** 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. LR 
statistics are calculated as -2× (log likelihood value of the original model - log likelihood 



















Voluntary environmental programs involve collaborative arrangements between 
firms and regulators that are based upon government offers of positive publicity and 
technical assistance to firms that reach certain environmental protection goals (Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2007), or commit to actions that will lead to improvement in their 
environmental performance (Delmas and Terlaak, 2001).  
Voluntary environmental programs differ from traditional policy instruments such 
as environmental taxation and emissions limits, in that they are less confrontational 
(Bjørner, Hansen and Russell, 2004) and are expected to generate win-win strategies for 
both participating firms and regulators. With the establishment of a cooperative 
relationship with regulators, participating firms can reduce their regulatory burden 
(Delmas and Keller, 2005), gain experience and develop techniques to deal with 
environmental programs, (Pizer, Morgenstein and Shih, 2008), and use such information 
to enhance their public reputation as socially responsible and environmentally-concerned 
citizens. To regulators, voluntary environmental programs have also provided 
opportunities to adjust their policies to reflect emerging environmental problems in 
industries (Pizer, Morgenstein and Shih, 2008) and achieve environment protection goals 
more efficiently.  
As a result of these benefits, voluntary programs have become increasingly 
popular policy tools around the world (Delmas and Terlaak, 2001). At least 13,000 
private sector firms had participated in some form of voluntary environmental program 
by the end of the 1990s (Mazurek, 2002), and over 300 such programs have been initiated 
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in the European Union (E.U.) (Borkey and Leveque, 1998). For example, the Agreement 
on Climate Protection, which started in 1995 between the German government and 
business, set a ten-year goal of reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 20% from 
1990 levels (German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, 1995). Similarly, the E.U. and the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association signed a voluntary agreement on reducing CO2 emissions of passenger 
vehicles sold in the E.U. from an average carbon equivalent of 186 gram/kilometer in 
1995 to 140 gram/kilometer or less by 2008 (Capros, Kouvaritakis, and Mantzos, 2001). 
Other important voluntary environmental programs in the E.U. include agreements on 
liquid waste minimization in the United Kingdom, on vehicle recycling in France, and on 
chemical industry emission reductions in the Netherlands (Delmas and Terlaak, 2001).  
The United States (U.S.) initially lagged behind the rest of the world (and 
especially the E.U.) in the adoption of voluntary environmental programs (Delmas and 
Terlaak, 2001). The total number of agreements initiated between the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) and U.S. industrial firms was 28 in the year 1996 (USEPA, 
2005) and only 42 between 1988 and 1998 (Mazurek, 1998). However, the number of 
voluntary environmental programs in the U.S. has undergone an “explosive growth” 
since then (Pizer, Morgenstein and Shih, 2008). USEPA, along with other federal 
agencies such as the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE), has initiated or revised a 
number of voluntary programs, including Energy Star, WasteWise, Combined Heat and 
Power Partnership, Clean Energy-Environment State Partnership, Green Power 
Partnership, and Climate Leaders. More recently, President Obama announced a new 
interagency initiative to develop a comprehensive and coordinated federal strategy aimed 
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at speeding the development and deployment of new voluntary environmental programs, 
with a goal of at least 5 to 10 new programs by 2016. The federal government expects 
that these programs will “encourage voluntary reductions from large corporations, 
consumers, industrial and commercial buildings and major industrial sectors” (USEPA, 
2011). 
While many firms and regulators have accepted voluntary environmental 
programs as marketing opportunities and policy tools, the effectiveness of these programs 
is, to some extent, dependent upon how consumers and other stakeholders react to them. 
The opportunities for consumers to be directly involved in and have effects on voluntary 
environmental programs have traditionally been very limited. Some studies have argued 
that consumers can be indirectly involved in promoting voluntary environmental 
protection activities through choosing products produced by participating manufacturers 
over that of non-participators (Clark and Russell, 2005). In order to do so, though, 
consumers must be able to differentiate between the two “types” of products, which 
requires environmental information to be made accessible to consumers (Kennedy, 
Laplante, and Maxwell, 1994). Environmental information of this type can be 
disseminated with explicit “eco-labels” such as the ENERGY STAR labeling program, 
which attaches a visible label to products that meet its environmental standard, and there 
are a number of empirical studies of consumer preferences regarding these (e.g. Ward, 
Clark, Jensen, Yen, and Russell, 2011; Chapter 2 of this thesis). However, consumer 
preferences for voluntary environmental programs that are not explicitly designed as eco-
labels is another question. 
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In this study, we investigate consumer preferences for products participating in 
voluntary environmental programs, by analyzing data from a contingent choice 
experiment survey that includes manufacturer participation in USEPA’s Climate Leaders 
program as a product attribute. We estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for product 
attributes, including whether the manufacturer participates in the Climate Leaders 
program. We also examine how other factors influence preferences for such participation. 
By addressing those questions, we expect to provide a greater understanding of the 
potential for voluntary environmental programs to influence consumer perceptions of 
products manufactured by participants in these programs. The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows. The next section provides a review of the relevant literature. A 
discussion of the methods and procedures employed in this study follows. The results are 
then presented and in the final section some conclusions and ideas for further research are 
offered.   
Literature Review 
 
Motivations for Environment-conscious Consumption 
Lancastrian utility theory posits that consumers are motivated to purchase a 
particular product because of the utility or satisfaction they derive from the characteristics 
or attributes that the product possesses (Lancaster, 1971). Prior studies suggest that, at 
least some consumers have preferences over the environmental attributes associated with 
the manufacture, distribution or use of a product (e.g. Loureiro, McCluskey and 
Mittelhammer, 2001; Cason and Gangadharan, 2002; Amacher, Koskela and Ollikainen, 
2004; Banerjee and Solomon, 2003; Limehouse, Melvin and McCormick, 2010). These 
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environmental attributes could generally be considered to be contributions to public 
goods, and sometimes are not readily available to the consumers who purchase the goods 
(Cornes and Sandler, 1984). Such consumer behavior is often referred to as 
“environment-conscious” (Lee and Holden 1999) or “pro-environmental” consumption 
(Cleveland, Kalamas and Laroche, 2005; Lindenberg and Steg, 2007), and is often costly 
in terms of money and time to the individual consumers (Thogersen and Olander, 2003).  
The motivation to voluntarily purchase or engage in other activities that 
contribute to public goods have been widely discussed in the economics literature 
(Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986; Andreoni, 1988; Cornes and Sandler, 1996). 
Kotchen (2007) identified three types of motivation: that these consumers are altruists; 
that they benefit from the aggregate level of the public good; or they make positive 
contributions to offset the negative impacts of their other behaviors. The literature review 
section of Chapter 2 includes a discussion of how such motivation might lead consumers 
to make environment-friendly purchases, and how the provision of environmental 
information through assists consumers in this regard.  
However, voluntary environmental programs and agreements, usually only 
involve manufacturers and government agencies and the effects of these programs or 
agreements generally occur during the production process, such as reducing pollution 
emissions associated with production, or switching to the use of clean energy to power 
the production process (Delmas and Terlaak, 2001). On the other hand, manufacturers 
often take advantage of their participation in voluntary environmental programs and use 
their participation as a promotional strategy to deliver an environment-friendly image of 
themselves and their products to consumers and the society, a process known as “green 
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marketing” (McDaniel and Rylander, 1993). A manufacturer participating in a voluntary 
environmental program often informs the public about its environmental performance and 
commitment to social responsibility, in order to distinguish itself from non-participating 
competitors (e.g. Polonsky, 1995; Menon and Menon, 1997). The environment-conscious 
consumer “carries the strongest vote with the dollar” (McDaniel and Rylander, 1993) and 
can send a message to manufacturers about their concerns for the environment by “voting” 
for, or purchasing the products of, the manufacturers that participate in the program. 
For consumers to take such actions, they need to not only be environmentally 
motivated but also convinced that their individual actions will have an effect, or what is 
referred to as perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) (e.g. Lee and Holden, 1999; Kim 
and Choi, 2005; Faiers, Cook and Neame, 2007). PCE is defined as “the evaluation of the 
self in the context of the issue” (Berger and Corbin 1992) as being different to faith in 
others (FIO), which is “faith or trust in the efficacy of other factors” (Berger and Corbin, 
1992). Ellen, Weiner and Cobb-Walgren (1991) describe PCE as the extent to which 
individuals believe that their personal actions could make a difference in solving 
problems, and that PCE for environmental issues is distinctly different from general 
environmental attitudes or concerns and has direct and unique effects on environment-
conscious behaviors.  It has been demonstrated that individual consumers who have 
strong confidence that their personal environment-friendly actions can lead to positive 
and effective consequences for the environment are more likely to be motivated to 
engage in such actions in support of their environmental concerns (Ellen, Weiner and 
Cobb-Walgren, 1991; Kim and Choi, 2005). Previous studies have also suggested that 
PCE is often affected by FIO, in other words, that these individual consumers need to 
 
 83
realize that their individual efforts are part of collective efforts to achieve positive 
outcomes, and that they need to have faith that others will do their part (Lee and Holden, 
1999; Faiers, Cook and Neame, 2007).  
 
Policy Background 
The Climate Leaders program was launched in February 2002 by USEPA as a 
voluntary environmental program to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
promote improved ambient environmental quality. USEPA defines the Climate Leaders 
program as an “industry-government partnership that provides guidance and recognition 
to companies developing long-term climate change strategies”. The Climate Leaders 
program strives to achieve these goals “through the development of rigorous accounting 
standards, management plan tools, and innovative reduction opportunities” (USEPA, 
2011).  
Thus, a company qualifies a Climate Leaders Partner (CLP) by committing to 
reduce their impact on the global environment through the development of a corporate-
wide GHG inventory using the protocol provided by the program, setting an aggressive 
GHG emissions reduction goal, and annually reporting to USEPA its progress towards 
the goal (USEPA, 2011). CLPs range from small firms8 to major corporations and they 
represent a variety of industries and sectors from manufacturers and utilities to financial 
institutions and retailers (USEPA, 2011b). The number of CLPs increased from 11 initial 
partners at the initiation of the program in 2002 to over 250 by the end of 2010.  
                                                 
8 Small firms and business operations participate in the Climate Leaders program in the form of Small 
Business Network Members.  
 
 84
USEPA has suggested that a company participating in the Climate Leaders 
program and qualifying as a CLP could enjoy a range of benefits (USEPA, 2011). First, 
participation in the program is voluntary and cost-free. Second, participants can receive 
free technical assistance from USEPA on such topics as implementing GHG accounting 
methods, monitoring GHG emissions, and techniques to improve emission inventory 
management. Third, by achieving their reduction goals, CLPs could achieve cost savings 
through improved energy efficiency, while reducing their impact on the global 
environment through the reduction of GHG emissions.  
CLPs also have the opportunity to receive USEPA recognition as environmental 
leaders and publicize a credible record of their accomplishments that can inform 
consumers and influence markets. USEPA publicly recognizes CLPs who have set and 
achieved GHG reduction goals through national press releases, national public service 
announcements in major national publications, and in USEPA’s Carbon Copy newsletter. 
CLPs also are also encouraged to publicize their participation, goals, and 
accomplishments, and USEPA provides them with a variety of resources to assist these 
efforts. In addition, CLPs are authorized to include the program label (Figure 3-1) in 
internal and external marketing materials (USEPA, 2011).  
Though the Climate Leaders program and the CLP “label” are not as explicitly 
recognizable as the actual eco-labeling programs such as the ENERGY STAR, the use of 
the program label in this way can be seen as a form of environmental information 
provision, closely analogous to eco-labeling. Besides, this program fits into the 
discussions on green marketing strategy and effects of environment-conscious behaviors. 
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Therefore, it is of great interest to investigate the effects of the CLP label on consumer 
preferences for products that are manufactured by CLPs. 
Data and Survey Methods 
 The data for conducting the analysis in this study were collected through an 
online survey hosted by Knowledge Networks® (KN) as described in Chapter 2. 
Responses of respondents who were randomly assigned to Climate Leaders versions of 
the survey instrument (353 responses, 25.3%) are used to achieve the objectives of this 
study. research. Information screens for the Climate Leaders label are shown in Figure 3-
2, and an example of one of the choice tasks is provided in Figure 3-3.
 
Econometric Framework 
To analyze consumer preferences for the CLP label, we employ both the 
conditional logit (CL) and the random parameter logit (RPL) models as discussed in 
Chapter 2. A CL and an RPL model which consist of only the product attributes, and a 
CL and an RPL model which consist of both the attribute variables and interaction terms 
between the CLP label and all demographic, attitudinal and other factors, respectively, 
were estimated. Model estimation was conducted with STATA software package, and the 
mixlogit module (Hole, 2007) with 1,000 Halton random draws were used to estimate the 
RPL models.  
The variable names, definitions and descriptions, along with sample statistics, are 
presented in Table 3-1. The product attribute variables included in this study are price 
(Price), capacity (Capacity), three binary variables for brands (LG, GE, and Kenmore, 
where Whirlpool is the base case), one binary variable for configuration (Frenchdoor, 
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where the Side-by-Side is the base case), three binary variables for the design of external 
dispensers (Ice for ice-only dispensers, Water for water-only, and IandW for both ice and 
water, where no external dispenser is the base case), and the variable for manufacturer 
participation in the Climate Leaders program (CLPLabel). All product attributes but price 
were randomized in the RPL models. Assuming that the price parameters “fixed” allows 
us to obtain normally distributed estimates of WTP for the non-price attributes (Train, 
2000). In addition to the product attribute variables, an alternative specific constant (ASC) 
was created to represent the “None” option.  
Variables representing age, gender, race, household income, education, number of 
household members, ownership status of living quarters, and residential location enter the 
models through interactions with the CLPLabel variable. Including individual 
characteristics as interactions allows us to account for heterogeneous preferences for the 
CLP label variable across individuals.  
Similar to the analysis procedures described in Chapter 2, we used factor analysis 
(FA) and STATA predict command to estimate PCE (PCE) and the attitudes towards and 
awareness of global climate change (GCC). The factor weights and scores can be seen in 
Table 3-3.  
Results 
 The number of total possible records collectable for the choice experiment is 
19,768. Taking out missing values, the actual number of records obtained and relevant to 
this study was 18,856.  
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The estimation results for the CL and RPL models are presented in Tables 3-4 and 
3-5. The fact that almost all of the random deviations of the RPL estimate results are 
significant at the 1% level or higher of significance indicates that the application of the 
RPL models to this data set is warranted. Likelihood-ratio tests suggest that the RPL 
models are preferred to the CL models. Similarly, likelihood-ratio tests indicate that the 
models with both attributes and interactions are preferred to attribute only models (df = 
10, and all tests have significantly large test statistics; see Tables 3-4 – 3-5). 
As expected, the price variable has negative and significant parameters in all 
models, implying that refrigerators are normal goods and that respondents are sensitive to 
changes in refrigerator prices.  
Parameter estimates for the CLP label variables are significant (1% of higher level 
of significance) and positive in all models except the RPL model with all factors. 
Parameter estimates for the other product attributes largely conform to a priori 
expectations. The estimated parameter for refrigerator capacity is positive and significant 
in both CL models but insignificant in the RPL model. The parameter estimates for the 
LG and GE brand variables are negative and significant in all models, while the 
parameter estimate for Kenmore is not significant in any of the models. These results 
suggest that Whirlpool, the base case, is preferred to LG or GE. The parameter estimates 
for the external dispensers variables (Water for water only dispenser, Ice for ice only 
dispenser, and IandW for both water and ice dispenser, as compared with refrigerators 
which have no dispensers available) are significant and positive in all models, suggesting 
that consumers prefer refrigerators with external dispensers to refrigerators without such 
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dispensers. Refrigerator configuration, i.e. French door or Side by side (Frenchdoor), is 
not significant in any of the models. 
Generally, the interaction terms tend to perform better (in terms of statistical 
significances) in the CL models than in the RPL models, as only one interaction term 
(PCE) is significant in the RPL model, while quite a few interaction terms are significant 
in the CL model.  
The parameter estimate for age (Age × Label) is negative and significant in the 
CL model, while the variable for squared age (Age2 × Label) is positive and significant. 
While many prior studies have found females to be more environment-conscious, the CL 
parameter estimate for gender variable (Male × Label, with Female as base case) is 
positive and significant, and it suggests that males are more likely to purchase 
refrigerators manufactured by CLP.  
The parameter estimates for the white and black variables (White × Label, Black 
× Label) are positive and significant in the CL model, suggesting that white and black 
consumers may be more likely to purchase CLP labeled refrigerators than “Non-White, 
Black nor Hispanic people”. The parameter estimate for the Hispanic variable is 
insignificant in both models.   
The parameter estimate for the variable that the respondents have graduated with 
bachelor’s degree or higher (Bachelor × Label) is significant and positive, implying that 
those respondents are significantly more likely to purchase CLP labeled refrigerators than 
those who never attended college.  The parameter estimate for respondents who attended 
college (College × Label) is insignificant in both models. 
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Of the variables representing income (Inc1 × Label, or income between $30,000 
to $60,000; Inc2 × Label, or $60,000 to $85,000; and Inc3 × Label, or income more than 
$85,000 per year), the parameter estimates for both the highest and second lowest 
category was positive and significant in the CL model, while the parameter estimate for 
the second highest was insignificant in both models.  
The parameter estimate for the variable indicating that the respondents or their 
families own their residences instead of living in rented residences (Ownership × Label) 
is significant and negative in the CL model but insignificant in the RPL model. The 
parameter estimate for South (South × Label) is negative and significant in the CL model, 
while those for the Northeast and Midwest (NE × Label and MW × Label) are 
insignificant in both models. The parameter estimate for respondents living in urban area 
(Metro × Label) is significant and positive in the CL model. Such results may imply that 
respondents living in West as opposed to South, in a rented home, or in urban areas, are 
more likely to purchase CLP labeled refrigerators. 
Finally, the results for attitudinal variables reflecting respondents’ perceived 
consumer effectiveness (PCE × Label) and environmental concern towards global 
climate change (GCC × Label) have significant and positive effects which conforms to a 
priori hypotheses that consumers who believe their collective actions can have significant 
effects and who have higher environmental concerns are more likely to engage in 
environment oriented actions such as purchasing eco-labeled refrigerators. 
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 The estimated WTPs for CLP label are significant and positive for all models, 
ranging from $66.155 to $70.256 when estimated with only product attributes, and from 
$65.478 to $209.079 when estimated with all factors included (Table 3-6).  
Conclusions and Implications 
In this study, we used data collected from contingent choice experiments for 
consumer preferences for refrigerators and manufacturer participation in the USEPA 
Climate Leaders program. In general, our findings suggest that consumers are willing to 
pay significantly more for refrigerators that are manufactured by companies participating 
in the Climate Leaders program. Depending on the econometric model used, the WTP 
estimates for the CLP label ranged from $65.478 to $209.079. In total, our findings may 
inform government agencies and other regulators of the effectiveness of voluntary 
environmental programs in affecting consumer preferences and provide incentives for 
more manufacturers to participate in these programs. 
We have also investigated the motivations for consumers to purchase refrigerators 
manufactured by participants in the Climate Leaders program. In estimated results of  
Logit models with fixed parameters, we found differences in age, education level, gender, 
race, and income have significant effects, while factors such as living quarter ownership 
status, locations of residency and whether living in rural or urban areas also play 
important roles. However, when randomized parameters were included, such effects 
became less significant. 
We also found that environment-conscious consumers are more willing to 
purchase environment-friendly products such as refrigerators manufactured by CLPs. 
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Also, not surprisingly, consumers with high PCE, i.e. consumers who have strong 
confidence that their personal environment-friendly actions can lead to positive and 
effective consequences for the environment are more likely to be motivated to purchase 
environment-friendly products. Overall, this study implies that voluntary environmental 
programs could have significant roles in transforming appliances market and helping to 
replace older, less environment-friendly manufacturing processes with environmentally 
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Table 3-1. Variable Names, Definitions and Sample Statistics 
 
Variable Definition and Description Sample Means 
Dependent Variable N = 18856 




Price $879, $929, $979, or $1,029  715.884 
CLPLabel 1 if CLP qualified, 0 if not 0.384 
Capacity 23.78, 24.52, 25.34, 25.83 cubic feet 18.632 
Frenchdoor 1 if French door style, 0 if side-by-side 0.384 
 
Refrigerator Brands (with "Whirlpool" as base case) 
 
LG 1 if LG brand, 0 otherwise 0.202 
GE 1 if GE brand, 0 otherwise 0.183 
Kenmore 1 if Kenmore brand, 0 otherwise 0.182 
 
External Dispenser Type (with "No Ice or Water" as base case) 
 
Ice 1 if equipped with external dispenser of ice only, 0 otherwise  0.201 
Water 1 if equipped with external dispenser of water only, 0 otherwise  0.182 
IandW 1 if equipped with external dispenser of both ice & water, 0 otherwise  0.183 
ASC 1 if “None” option, 0 otherwise 0.25 
Age Age of respondent in years divided by 10 1.771 
Age2 Age*Age 0.925 
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.181 
 
Race (with "Non-White, Black nor Hispanic" as base case) 
 
White 1 if White 0.270 
Black 1 if African-American 0.042 
Hispanic 1 if Hispanic 0.049 
Education (with "Less than college level education" as base case)  
College 1 if have some college level education 0.111 
Bachelor 1 if hold bachelor's or higher degree 0.104 
 
Household Income (with "Less than $30,000" as base case) 
 
Inc1 1 if $30,000 to $60,000 0.128 





(Continued from Table 3-1) 
Variable Definition and Description Sample Means 
Inc3 1 if $85,000 or higher 0.083 
HHSize Head count of household members, 1-10 1.026 
Ownership 1 if Own the current living quarters, 0 if rent or others 0.271 
 
Residential location (with "West" as base case) 
 
NE 1 if reside in Northeast 0.070 
MW 1 if reside in Midwest 0.084 
South 1 if reside in South 0.140 
Metro 1 if reside in metropolitan areas 0.319 
PCE Factor analysis index score for perceived consumer effectiveness  0.020 
GCC Factor analysis index score for attitude towards global climate change -0.012 






Table 3-2. Attitudinal Questions Included in the Study* 
  
1. When I buy products, I consider how my use of them will affect the environment. 
2. By choosing environmentally friendly products, I signal to manufacturers the types of 
products they should be producing. 
3. Global climate change will have a noticeably negative impact on the environment in 
which my family and I live. 
4. There is no urgent need to take measures to prevent global climate change today. 
5. The production of electricity from renewable sources such as solar, wind and 
biomass is an effective way to combat global climate change. 
6. The most effective way to combat global climate change is to reduce energy 
consumption. 
7. We need more government regulations to force people to protect the environment. 



























Table 3-3. Factor Analysis Index for Attitudinal Questions 
 Chronbach’s alpha Factor 
Weight 
1. Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) 0.7937  
1-1. When I buy products, I consider how my use of them will affect the environment. 0.6517 
1-2. By choosing environmentally friendly products, I signal to manufacturers the types 
of products they should be producing. 
0.6408 
2. Attitudes towards Global Climate Change (GCC) 0.7903  
2-1. Global climate change will have a noticeably negative impact on the environment in 
which my family and I live. 
0.6450 
2-2. There is no urgent need to take measures to prevent global climate change today. -0.5585 
2-3. The production of electricity from renewable sources such as solar, wind and 
biomass is an effective way to combat global climate change. 
0.6456 
2-4. The most effective way to combat global climate change is to reduce energy 
consumption. 
0.6983 





Table 3-4. Conditional and Random Parameter Logit Results for Climate Leaders 
Survey Attributes Only Models 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
Price -0.006*** 0.0004 0.000 -0.010*** 0.001 0.000 
CLPLabel 0.406*** 0.046 0.000 0.678*** 0.102 0.000 
Capacity 0.055* 0.031 0.074 0.088 0.057 0.123 
Frenchdoor 0.030 0.047 0.517 -0.213 0.331 0.520 
LG -0.202*** 0.067 0.002 -0.372*** 0.119 0.002 
GE -0.149** 0.068 0.028 -0.311*** 0.121 0.010 
Kenmore -0.013 0.067 0.842 -0.040 0.136 0.767 
Ice 0.621*** 0.072 0.000 0.885*** 0.140 0.000 
Water 0.437*** 0.075 0.000 0.493*** 0.118 0.000 
IandW 1.325*** 0.072 0.000 1.875*** 0.246 0.000 
ASC -3.205*** 0.874 0.000 -7.137*** 1.798 0.000 
Random Deviation 
CLPLabel 1.016*** 0.140 0.000 
Capacity 0.041*** 0.012 0.001 
Frenchdoor 2.768*** 0.333 0.000 
LG 0.557*** 0.176 0.002 
GE 0.522*** 0.158 0.001 
Kenmore 0.694*** 0.205 0.001 
Ice 1.000*** 0.177 0.000 
Water 0.541*** 0.230 0.019 
IandW 2.154*** 0.274 0.000 
ASC -4.199*** 0.481 0.000 
Log-likelihood -6299.805     -4362.856     
LR Test: LR Statistic = 3873.898, df = 10 
 




Table 3-5. Conditional and Random Parameter Logit Results for Climate Leaders Survey 
All Factors Models 
Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
Price -0.006*** 0.000 0.000 -0.010*** 0.001 0.000 
CLPLabel 1.673*** 0.417 0.000 0.655 1.169 0.575 
Capacity 0.064** 0.032 0.044 0.039 0.059 0.511 
Frenchdoor 0.027 0.049 0.586 -0.572 0.455 0.209 
LG -0.179*** 0.069 0.009 -0.325** 0.128 0.011 
GE -0.139** 0.070 0.046 -0.295** 0.131 0.025 
Kenmore -0.018 0.069 0.795 -0.044 0.134 0.743 
Ice 0.625*** 0.074 0.000 0.846*** 0.171 0.000 
Water 0.439*** 0.078 0.000 0.436*** 0.137 0.002 
IandW 1.365*** 0.074 0.000 2.154*** 0.249 0.000 
ASC -2.890*** 0.902 0.001 -8.232*** 1.953 0.000 
Age × Label -0.719*** 0.120 0.000 -0.074 0.326 0.821 
Age2 × Label 0.663*** 0.119 0.000 0.045 0.315 0.887 
Male × Label 0.196** 0.082 0.017 0.010 0.257 0.968 
White × Label 0.407** 0.194 0.036 -0.161 0.413 0.696 
Black × Label 0.581** 0.240 0.016 0.327 0.737 0.657 
Hispanic × Label -0.118 0.218 0.588 -0.660 0.604 0.274 
College × Label -0.040 0.098 0.685 -0.437 0.340 0.199 
Bachelor × Label 0.320*** 0.103 0.002 0.150 0.307 0.626 
Inc1 × Label 0.192* 0.109 0.077 0.134 0.293 0.648 
Inc2 × Label 0.151 0.134 0.258 0.069 0.380 0.857 
Inc3 × Label 0.276** 0.137 0.045 0.212 0.368 0.564 
HHSize × Label 0.036 0.031 0.248 0.005 0.097 0.961 
Ownership×Label -0.333*** 0.102 0.001 -0.339 0.280 0.225 
NE × Label -0.206 0.136 0.129 0.017 0.373 0.965 
MW × Label -0.031 0.125 0.803 0.279 0.411 0.498 
South × Label -0.176* 0.108 0.104 0.141 0.334 0.672 
Metro × Label 0.188* 0.110 0.088 0.324 0.307 0.291 
PCE × Label 0.138** 0.056 0.014 0.314** 0.127 0.013 
GCC × Label 0.233*** 0.054 0.000 0.154 0.120 0.199 





(Continued from Table 3-5) 
Random Deviation 
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value Mean of Est. Std. Error p-value 
CLPLabel 0.937*** 0.124 0.000 
Capacity 0.156*** 0.017 0.000 
Frenchdoor 2.877*** 0.309 0.000 
LG 0.410 0.339 0.227 
GE 0.551** 0.287 0.055 
Kenmore 0.720*** 0.191 0.000 
Ice 1.173*** 0.230 0.000 
Water 0.751*** 0.228 0.001 
IandW 2.113*** 0.317 0.000 
ASC 0.266 0.794 0.738 
Log-likelihood -5921.230     -4160.205     
LR Test: LR Statistic = 3522.05, df = 10 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3-6. Estimated WTP for Product Attributes 
 
 Attributes only 
 Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Attribute Mean Estimate Std. Error. Mean Estimate Std. Error. 
CLPLabel 70.256*** 9.368 66.155*** 10.878 
Capacity 9.484* 5.406 8.765* 5.813 
Frenchdoor 5.278 8.165 -20.581 32.519 
LG -34.789** 11.770 -36.521** 12.646 
GE -25.570** 11.961 -30.652** 12.777 
Kenmore -2.198 11.539 -4.171 13.372 
Ice 107.320*** 14.131 86.418*** 15.786 
Water 75.641*** 13.723 48.213*** 12.182 
IandW 229.123*** 20.897 183.529*** 31.371 
     
 All Factors 
 Conditional Logit Random Parameter Logit 
Attribute Mean Estimate Std. Error. Mean Estimate Std. Error. 
CLPLabel 209.079*** 48.261 65.478*** 71.401 
Capacity 11.214** 5.698 3.937 5.989 
Frenchdoor 4.707 8.636 -55.689 44.814 
LG -31.530** 12.161 -32.375** 13.603 
GE -24.606* 12.281 -29.432** 14.272 
Kenmore -3.183 12.231 -4.772 13.614 
Ice 109.751*** 14.659 83.723*** 17.846 
Water 77.235*** 14.470 43.057** 13.548 
IandW 240.021*** 22.491 213.850*** 34.313 
 






















In this study we investigated two types of environmental information provision 
programs, i.e. the explicit eco-label, the ENERGY STAR, and the voluntary 
environmental program and agreement, the Climate Leaders program. To examine how 
these programs affect consumer preferences, WTP for these labels were estimated, based 
on econometric models using only product attributes and both product attributes and 
demographic information and other factors. We can draw several concluding remarks 
from the results of this study. 
For both analyses, we found WTP estimates for the ENERGY STAR label and the 
CLP participation to be positive and significant, indicating that consumers are willing to 
pay a premium for environmentally friendly products equivalent to a significant portion 
of the purchase prices, regardless of whether the environmental benefits occur in the 
consumption or production process. WTP for the ENERGY STAR label ranges from 
$81.683 to $394.276, depending on the econometric model used, which is higher than the 
range of WTPs for the Climate Leaders program of $65.478 to $209.079. 
We examined the impacts of monetary incentives such as a mail-in rebate on 
consumer preferences for the ENERGY STAR label. When only product attributes were 
included in the models, we found that WTP for the ENERGY STAR label without rebate 
is higher than WTP for the ENERGY STAR label with rebate, while the findings for 
models incorporating both product attributes and demographic characteristics are the 
opposite. The differences may be because of several reasons, such as consumers are more 
concerned with the product quality when a rebate is provided, or consumers hold 
different perspectives towards a rebate because of heterogeneous preferences. 
 
 111
The effects of demographic characteristics, such as age, income, education, 
gender and race, as well as household characteristics and location of residence, on 
preferences for the “labeled” products, were also examined. In general, we found that for 
both the ENERGY STAR label and the Climate Leaders programs, younger consumers 
with higher incomes and higher levels of educational attainment may be more likely to 
engage in “green” purchases. Females are found to be more likely to purchase ENERGY 
STAR labeled products, while males are found to be more likely to purchase Climate 
Leaders program products.  
Last but not least, our analyses provided further evidence that environmental 
attitudes and concerns, as well as perceived consumer effectiveness, have positive and 
significant effects on consumer purchases of environmentally friendly products.  
Our findings could provide information to government agencies that are 
considering environmental information provision programs, in the form of either an eco-
label or a voluntary environmental agreement as they suggest that either can be effective 
as a policy tool in environmental regulation. To home appliance manufacturers, such 
findings may help them in determining the market benefits they can receive by 
conforming to higher environmental standards in terms of product attributes or the 
manufacturing process. Yet our findings are limited to the studies based on 
environmentally friendly refrigerators, and might not reflect the effects of environmental 
information provision programs on other products. Hence future researchers may want to 
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